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101 PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE STABILITY AND GROWTH 
PACT. WHY SO MANY? A SURVEY 
Jonas Fischer, Lars Jonung and Martin Larch 




The failure of key EU Member States to respect the requirements of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) a few years after its inception triggered a heated debate on how to reform the 
framework of fiscal policy coordination in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This 
paper systematically analyzes 101 reform proposals presented by professional academic and 
non-academic economists prior to March 2005, when the Council of the European Union 
adopted a revised version of the SGP. Each proposal is characterized by a set of variables 
reflecting features such as the degree of modification of the SGP, the background of its 
author(s), the main aim attached to fiscal policy coordination in the EMU, the timing of the 
proposal and the type of proposal made. Using multivariate statistical analysis, roughly four 
different schools of thought concerning the reform of the SGP are identified. In line with the 
main findings of the political economy literature, all four schools of thought share the view 
that in the absence of specific rules fiscal policy would lead to excessive deficits and hence 
affect the conduct of the common monetary policy. However, beyond this common 
denominator, there is no consensus on how best to co-ordinate fiscal policy. 
 
We present several explanations for the multitude of proposals, the most important being the 
present lack of a consensus in the economics profession concerning the role of fiscal policy. 
Economists hold diverging views on the goals, instruments, efficiency and institutions for 
fiscal policy-making. This state of affairs is in sharp contrast to the case of monetary policy. 
In addition, the institutional framework for the SGP was completely new. The euro area is the 
first case where monetary policy-making is centralized while fiscal policy-making is 
decentralized to national governments. As long as we lack consensus on the proper role of 
fiscal policy, the SGP will be the subject of different economic assessments. 
 
Key words: Monetary union, euro, fiscal policy, Stability and Growth Pact, international 
policy coordination, EMU, European Union, Europe. 
 
JEL classification: E32, E62, E63, C23, H30 
 
Please note: The views expressed here are those of the authors. They do not represent the 
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101 PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE STABILITY AND GROWTH 





The purpose of the paper is to analyze, in a systematic way, the large number of proposals for 
reforming the Stability and Growth Pact (the SGP) presented by professional academic and 
non-academic economists in recent years. Our aim is first to identify different schools of 
thought concerning the role of fiscal policy in the European Union and then to explain the 
differences among them. Here we examine differences among the proposals across time, 
countries and other dimensions using multivariate statistical analysis. 
 
The background for our study is the recent crisis of the EU fiscal framework which led to the 
suspension of the SGP in November 2003 and the adoption of a reformed SGP in March 
2005. Growing political tensions concerning the SGP went along with a growing and 
increasingly lively discussion about the main caveats of the EU budgetary framework and 
potential solutions. The discussion was carried on within political and academic circles giving 
rise to a veritable industry of SGP therapists who produced a wide range of proposals on how 
to properly implement fiscal policy-making in the EMU. 
When viewed from an adequate distance and disregarding the actual trigger of the crisis, the 
discussion about the SGP can be read as the symptom of a more fundamental disagreement. 
As regards the political debate, it could simply be taken to mirror conflicts of interest or 
maybe dynamic policy inconsistencies which feature prominently in the political economy 
literature. The disagreement among professional economists has a somewhat different 
connotation. It clearly signals that there is no consensus about the proper goals and 
instruments of fiscal policy, either in a domestic and or an international setting. Even the 
empirical question about the effects of fiscal policy measures on domestic and international 
demand is disputed. There is also a lack of agreement concerning the proper institutions for 
framing fiscal policy. This state of affairs is in sharp contrast to the case of monetary policy, 
                                                 
1 We have received valuable comments from Roel Beetsma, Michael Bergman, Iain Begg, Martin Flodén, 
Dermot Hodson, Jan in't Veld, Roman Kräussl, Ludger Schuknecht, Alessandro Turrini and Charles Wyplosz. 
We thank seminar participants at the 2006 SNEE European Integration Conference, Mölle and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco for suggestions. Research assistance by Paolo Biraschi is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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where there is more of a consensus about the goals, instruments and institutional framework 
of monetary policy-making.  
The fact that the EMU is a unique construction adds to the fiscal policy debate. The euro area 
is the first monetary union in history where a group of independent countries have handed 
over their monetary sovereignty to a common central bank, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), while retaining domestic control over fiscal policy-making, thus giving professional 
economists new turf on which to test their ability to present policy proposals. And as we will 
demonstrate, they have used this opportunity amply. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the history of the SGP. This survey is 
crucial to understand the economic and political background of the many proposals for 
reform. Section 3 examines and organises 101 proposals of reform of the SGP using cluster 
analysis. To this end, each proposal is classified according to a number of variables such as 
the main policy objective pursued and the proposed degree of policy modification involved.  
Section 4 compares the actual reform of the SGP adopted by the Council of the European 
Union with the academic debate reflected in the 101 proposals. Section 5 offers an 
explanation of why there are more than one hundred proposals on the intellectual market for 
reforming the SGP. Here we answer the question: why do the views of academic economists 
differ so widely on fiscal policy-making in the EU?  The final section concludes. 
 
2. Sailing with the SGP: A historical overview 
The SGP provides the framework for the co-ordination of national fiscal policies for Europe's 
monetary union. It was established to address the risk of negative spillovers from the 
budgetary positions of individual Member States into the common monetary policy. It 
consists of (i) a preventive part which, in its pre-reform version, required Member States to 
aim towards a medium-term budgetary position of 'close to balance or in surplus', and (ii) a 
corrective part laying out procedural provision for the correction of an excessive deficit, that 
is a deficit above the reference value of 3 % of GDP.
2  
 
Whether there is a need for a common framework for fiscal policy co-ordination and, if so, 
how it should be designed, has never stopped being debated, though the intensity of the 
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debate has ebbed and flowed. Below we outline three periods in the ‘voyage’ of the SGP. 
First, we focus on some elements of the debate that took place ahead of the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the establishment of the SGP in 1996. Second, we look at the 
first few years of the SGP when economic developments were beneficial and frictions within 
the SGP were few. Third, we examine the later years when economic developments were less 
favourable and procedural problems escalated, leading up to the crisis in late 2003 and later 
on to the reform of the SGP in March 2005. 
 
2.1. Designing, building and naming the ship: from Maastricht to a Stability and Growth 
Pact 
 
The debate before the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 mainly revolved around the 
question whether an optimal currency area was a pre-condition for a successful monetary 
union or whether monetary integration itself could drive harmonisation.
3 In the end, the 
Maastricht Treaty was a compromise including a strict time schedule for the realisation of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), combined with strict (nominal) convergence criteria 
to qualify for membership. As regards fiscal rules, there was an understanding that restrictions 
on national fiscal policy were necessary, but some did not share the view that the rules written 
into the Treaty were instrumental, for example Bean (1992). 
 
After the economic recession in the early 1990s, budget deficits, debt levels and 
unemployment soared and the Maastricht plan of a common currency seemed ever more 
improbable, but in the mid-1990s the likelihood of EMU actually materialising increased. 
However, Germany got cold feet as its domestic climate became more hostile to the idea of 
EMU. The Germans’ fear was that once countries had passed the convergence tests and 
entered EMU, their incentives to preserve the achieved budgetary discipline would evaporate. 
To persuade Germany to give up the DM, more assurance that budgetary policies would 
remain sound and stability-oriented also inside the EMU, especially on the part of those 
members with a history of high inflation, deficits and debt, was required. In 1995, German 
Minister of Finance Theo Waigel proposed a ‘Stability Pact for Europe’ where the 3 % of 
GDP deficit objective (one of the convergence criteria for joining the euro) would become a 
firm upper ceiling, sanctions for exceeding the reference value would be automatic and a new 
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Stability Council comprising only participating Member States would implement the 
framework (Costello (2001)). 
 
However, the end product was far less mechanical than the initial proposal. Instead, the 
Commission set up a framework that (i) clarified the meaning of the provisions of the 
Maastricht Treaty regarding the excessive deficit procedure, and (ii) committed the members 
of the monetary union to a medium-term budgetary objective of  'close to balance or in 
surplus'. 
 
On the basis of 1997 outcomes, 11 countries qualified for EMU (Greece joined later in 2000) 
after making significant fiscal consolidation efforts. Overall, the ‘quality’ of the 
consolidation, mainly on the expenditure side, was considerable, even if some ‘creative 
accounting’ and other one-off measures on the margin also helped bring government deficits 
under the ceiling. 1998 was a good year in terms of economic growth and the automatic 
stabilisers further reduced deficits, overall creating some margin for manoeuvre within the 3 
% reference value, thus setting the scene for a good start of the EMU on 1 January 1999. 
 
2.2. Setting sail and enjoying fair winds: 1999–first half of 2001 
 
Building on the 1997-98 developments, the SGP got off to a smooth virgin voyage. In 1999, 
the first operational year of the SGP, the euro-area Member States’ budgetary deficits 
continued to improve on the back of continued good growth conditions and the working of the 
automatic stabilisers. 
 
Figure 1 presents the weighted budget balance for the euro area and the projections made 
across consecutive generations of stability programmes. It shows clearly that on average 
budget deficits in 1999-2000 came out better than planned. For 1999, the main explanation 
was the composition of economic growth which turned out to be very ‘budget-friendly’ 
yielding higher-than-expected tax receipts.
4 The easy sailing with high growth continued in 
2000.
5 Eight out of twelve euro-area countries showed budget surpluses. Only Greece, France, 
Italy and Portugal still had deficits close to or above 1.5 per cent of GDP. 
                                                 
4 A better than foreseen outcome of the 1998 budgets, a reduced interest burden and a changeover from ESA79 
to ESA95 accounting standards played a role. 
5 In 2000, the average budget position in the EU was a surplus of 0.9% of GDP. However, this included sizeable 
one-off receipts from the sale of Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) licences in several 
countries; netting out UMTS resulted in a deficit of 0.3 per cent of GDP.   -8-
Figure 1: General government budget balance of the euro area 
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Sources: National stability and convergence programmes and the European Commission. 
 
The improvement of actual deficits concealed the fact that underlying budgetary positions did 
not change as much. Indeed, according to the current Commission estimates the euro-area 
cyclically-adjusted budget deficit was close to 2 % over the 1997-2000-period and the 
primary cyclically-adjusted balance deteriorated. 
 
Over this first period, from a procedural perspective there were few problems. The mirage of 
the improving actual budget figures deflected a debate about the implementation of the SGP. 
Some discussion nevertheless started on how to make the framework binding in good times as 
well as bad. Some commentators, including the Commission, argued that it would be better to 
pay more attention to cyclically-adjusted budget figures. 
 
Even so, there was a certain degree of consolidation fatigue and also a call to broaden the 
scope of the budgetary policy debate. Issues like how to improve the composition (‘the 
quality’) of government expenditures and how to achieve the necessary conditions to finance 
tax cuts surfaced. There were also some procedural upsets. In an effort to upgrade the status 
of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)
6 as an instrument to guide also fiscal 
policies, the Commission took the Irish government to task, despite Ireland being in a surplus 
position, for conducting pro-cyclical polices. However, the Irish government rejected the 
                                                 
6 The BEPGs give advice on macroeconomic policies including product and labour market policies. As regards 
budgetary policies, the ‘quality’ aspects would fall under the BEPGs but policies under the SGP must be 
consistent with the BEPGs introducing a procedural link between the BEPGs and the SGP.   -9-
Commission’s strictures and the whole incident boded ill for both the procedures and the 
status of the BEPGs. 
 
When judging the lack of fiscal consolidation during these years, we should keep in mind that 
the underlying rate of economic growth was generally perceived to be significantly higher 
than it actually turned out to be.
7 Towards the end of spring 2001 a decisive shift occurred 
when the economic cycle took a sudden turn for the worse, which give way to a protracted 
period of slow growth. 
 
2.3. Hitting heavy weather and finally running aground: second half 2001-March 2005 
 
Signs of procedural alarm started to show early in 2002 as the first steps were taken to 
implement the SGP’s corrective arm. Early that year the Commission proposed that the 
Council should issue an ‘early warning’ to Germany and Portugal that their deficits were fast 
approaching the 3 % of GDP reference value.
8 The Council of the European Union, however, 
decided not to follow the Commission’s suggestion. Minor as this may have appeared, this 
was the first clear signal that there was some substance to the fear that the SGP would not 
prove seaworthy in bad weather. This minor conflict contained already most of the key 
elements showing in the forthcoming reform debate: the Council versus the Commission, 
small versus large Member States, acting early on indications versus waiting for outcomes, 
sticking to agreed rules versus not forcing fiscal consolidations in unfavourable economic 
conditions. 
 
Already by autumn 2002 it was clear that both Germany and Portugal would breach the 3 % 
of GDP reference value, while the situation in France was also deteriorating rapidly. After 
this, things moved quickly.
9 Towards the autumn of 2003, it was clear that the German efforts 
had not had the desired effect. Moreover, the 2004 budget laws showed that Germany and 
France would fail to bring their deficits below the 3 % of GDP reference value in 2004 as 
                                                 
7 For example, in 2001 the real time estimate of potential output growth in the euro area (as given in the 
Commission’s Public Finance Report of 2000, presented in spring 2000), was 2 1/2% of GDP as opposed to the 
current estimate of around 2%. 
8 The early warning is part of the preventive arm of the SGP.   
9 An excessive deficit was established for Portugal in November 2002 and for Germany in January 2003. France 
received an ‘early warning’ in January 2003 and an excessive deficit was deemed to exist in June. All three 
countries were told by the Council to take action to bring the deficit below the 3% threshold (in 2003 for 
Portugal and in 2004 for Germany and France). Germany did take action and presented measures worth some 
1% of GDP in spring 2003.   -10-
required. At this stage the Commission asked the Council to issue a new recommendation to 
the two countries, requesting further action on top of that included in the 2004 budgets while 
at the same time postponing the deadline for meeting the 3 % limit by one year, to 2005, in 
view of the weak economic outlook.  However, at the meeting on 25 November 2003, the 
Council decided not adopt the recommendations and put the procedure on hold instead. The 
decision was not unanimous. Most of the smaller Member States (incidentally usually 
fulfilling the ‘close to balance’ requirement) voted in favour of the Commission’s 
recommendation but the larger countries (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) formed a 
blocking minority. 
 
Instead of adopting the formal recommendations prepared by the Commission, the Council 
issued its own conclusions which were broadly in line with what the Commission had 
requested. The crucial difference was procedural. Had the Council adopted the Commission’s 
recommendation and France and Germany failed to comply, the next step would have been 
sanctions in the form of a deposit.
10 
 
The Commission judged that it could not accept the SGP legislation being disregarded and 
asked the European Court of Justice to bring clarity to the procedure by assessing whether the 
Council had the right to take decision in this way. The Court presented its verdict in July 2004 
and ruled that the Council did not have the right to sidestep the legal procedures. 
 
In the meantime, the procedural activity had intensified and broadened as weak economic 
developments increasingly impacted on budget positions.
11 The increase in procedural activity 
(at the time of writing, outside the euro area, six of the new Member States have also been put 
in excessive deficit) and the clarification of the legal status of the SGP by the European Court 
of Justice cleared the way for a broader, formal reform debate. On 3 September 2004, the 
Commission presented a communication on how to improve the SGP (called ‘Strengthening 
economic governance and clarifying the implementation of the SGP’) proposing four main 
                                                 
10 This may be converted into a fine after two years if the deficit remains excessive. 
11 On the bright side, Portugal, on the back of massive one-off efforts, managed to get back below the 3% ceiling 
in time and its excessive deficit procedure was lifted (this was of course a short-term success as Portugal is now 
back in excessive deficit). In April 2004, even the Netherlands was put in an excessive deficit position (which 
was abrogated already in May 2005). Greece has dived deepest into the EDP sea, its fall highlighting both the 
accounting and electoral dimensions of the SGP. It was put in excessive deficit in July 2004 after a revision of its 
reported budget data, which have been repeatedly revised since then. In April 2004, the Commission proposed   -11-
areas of reform: 1) more focus on debt and sustainability; 2) country-specific medium-term 
targets; 3) taking more economic factors and circumstances into account; and 4) earlier 
preventive action. On this basis and after long discussions, the European Council was able to 
endorse an agreement on 20 March 2005. This agreement and how it related to the proposals 
put forward in the academic debate is further discussed in section 4 below.  
 
3. The empirical analysis 
 
3.1. The set of proposals to be analyzed 
 
As of 20 March 2005, the cut-off date of our survey, we collected a sample of 101 reform 
proposals made available in the English language by professional academic and non-academic 
economists in and outside Europe.
12 Proposals advanced by policy-makers or non-economists 
were not considered because our focus is on the economic profession’s point of view. The 
complete list of reform proposals, presented in alphabetic order, is given in Annex 1. 
While our selection of working papers, reports, published and unpublished articles may still 
not cover the entire literature on the subject, we are convinced that we have identified a 
significant and representative part of it.
13 Of course, more proposals are likely to have 
emerged after our cut-off date of March 2005. In particular, the report of the European 
Council of 20 March 2005 mapping out the ‘reformed SGP’ triggered a new wave of 
assessments and proposals from the economics profession. However, we believe that cutting 
the sample off with the arrival of the new Pact gives us a sufficiently interesting collection of 
reform proposals to analyze. In short, they cover the history of the ‘old SGP’.  
Predictably, many proposals in our collection share some similarities regarding both the 
analysis, be it theoretical or empirical, and the policy conclusions. But each proposal also 
exhibits some individual distinctive features. To avoid getting bogged down in a tedious 
descriptive and qualitative analysis of the mass of proposals, we have characterised each 
proposal by a set of eleven variables, mostly nominal and a few cardinal, referring to the 
                                                                                                                                                          
that Italy should be given an ‘early warning’ by the Council. Again, as in 2002, the Council did not take action 
(elections were imminent in Italy at that time), and today Italy is of course in an excessive deficit position. 
12 Due to the revisions of the SGP in March 2005, the flow of proposals slowed down significantly. 
13 We have taken great pains to identify proposals to reform the SGP, searching the web and working paper sites 
of various organizations and universities. One limitation is language as we have ruled out non-English 
contributions. However, we believe that original proposals of reform made in other languages than English 
would have found their way into the English language sooner or later. Thus, we do not regard our focus on 
English as a major problem.    -12-
background of the authors and the type of proposals they make. The database obtained in this 
way lends itself to basic multivariate statistical analysis, the results of which form the basis 
for our interpretative work. 
In terms of the economic content of the proposals, two variables are crucial: (i) the main 
economic policy objective of the SGP advocated by the authors, and (ii) the suggested 
modification of the current institutional setup. Concerning the policy objective, we distinguish 
between seven different categories: (1) short-term stabilisation, (2) short-term budgetary 
discipline, (3) long-run sustainability, (4) optimal policy mix, (5) economic growth, (6) 
various combinations of policy aims, and finally as a separate entity those proposals arguing 
that (7) the SGP serves no purpose, and thus that a market solution is superior to the system of 
administrative surveillance. Of course, there are trade-offs and/or complementarities across 
these main goals. However, for the purpose of our analysis we have identified what we view 
as the main aim.  
With regard to the suggested modifications of the SGP, we choose six different categories for 
classifying the proposals. These categories are ranked according to the degree of modification 
ranging from (0) for ‘no modification’ to (5) for ‘abolish the SGP and go for alternatives’.  
The time dimension of each proposal is captured by the distance measured in months between 
the date of publication of the proposal and November 2003. As mentioned above, 25 
November 2003 formally marks the apex of the SGP crisis when the Council of the European 
Union decided not to implement the provisions of the SGP recommended by the Commission 
vis-à-vis France and Germany. 
A detailed description of the variables characterising each proposal is provided in Table 1.  
The classification of the 101 reform proposals based on our characterising variables can be 
found in Annex 2.  
The main aim of the quantitative analysis of the set of 101 proposals is to examine the degree 
of consensus or the lack of it among professional economists concerning the SGP and its fate. 
Several questions spring to mind. How dispersed are the views about the objectives of the 
SGP? Have views changed over time? How important are welfare considerations vis-à-vis 
considerations of political economy? Are there significant differences between the proposals 
of academic and non-academic economists? Do views differ between contributions from euro-
area countries and non-euro-area countries? Does the size of the proposal-maker’s country 
matter?    -13-
The overview of the 101 SGP proposals, displayed in Table 2, shows the distribution across 
the characterising variables. As expected, the number of recommended therapies increased – 
almost exponentially – as the SGP crisis matured. Most of them were advanced in the two 
years immediately before and after the 2003 Council decision effectively put the Pact in 
abeyance, reflecting the topical and politically pressing nature of the issue. The geographical 
distribution is very EU-centred: around 80 per cent of the proposals originated from European 
economists, of which less than one fourth were from non-euro-area countries. More than half 
of the proposals were produced by academics. Nevertheless, the fact that around one fourth of 
the proposals were advanced by non-academics brings out the political prominence of the 
SGP.  
The overview in Table 2 also reveals the absence of a clear majority position on one key 
element of the EU fiscal framework. The 101 proposals are widely spread across the variable 
capturing the main aim of the SGP as identified by the author of the proposal.  
Concerning the concrete measures on how to reform the SGP, about half of the proposals 
argue that changes in rules and procedures within the existing framework are sufficient to 
improve budgetary surveillance. This essentially matches the actual outcome of the SGP 
reform debate as embodied in the Council report of 20 March 2005. However, a significant 
number of the proposals advocate a more radical break, including changes to the institutional 
setup or entirely new institutions. On the other hand, a small number of economists are of the 
opinion that the SGP needs no change.
14  
An examination of the underpinnings of the reform proposals reveals first of all that the vast 
majority of them do not provide an explicit theoretical basis and, second, that only about half 
of the authors conduct empirical analysis to corroborate their views. This picture could be an 
indication of the strong political dimension of the debate. An alternative and equally plausible 
reading is that a great many authors build their analysis or proposal on the existing evidence 
which they regard as commonly known and accepted. 
The time dimension is an important aspect. As shown in Table 2, the reform debate attracted 
an increasing number of economists as November 2003 drew closer and kept its sustained 
momentum in the seventeen months period up to April 2005. Around one third of the 
                                                 
14 Clearly, this distribution may not be genuinely representative for the entire population. We cannot rule a out a 
selection bias in the sense that economists who see no need to change the SGP may have been less inclined to 
participate in the discussion than others.   -14-
proposals were advanced in the twelve months preceding the Council's decision not to step up 
the excessive deficit procedure for Germany and France and close to 50 % in the seventeen 
months period leading to the actual reform of the SGP in early 2005. This corresponds to an 
average output of 2.7 proposals per month. 
In the beginning and up until November 2003, the debate was mostly sustained by economists 
from academia. By November 2003 around 60 % of all academics in our samples had already 
advanced proposals. Conversely, the bulk of the non-academic economists started to get 
involved only after the SGP crisis had become acute, i.e. after November 2003.  
At a very early stage, that is at the time of the Maastricht agreement, the academic discussion 
on the design of the budgetary framework underpinning EMU was not particularly animated, 
though there were some early contributions, for example Buiter et al. (1993). Most attention 
had naturally been given to the proper conditions for membership. Among the 101 proposals, 
those contributions relating to alternative frameworks, such as market solutions, generally 
surfaced at this stage. 
As regards the proposed degree of modification to the old SGP, the reform proposals tended 
to converge towards a clear majority view as the debate unfolded. In the very early stages, 
there was a sharper division of views with a still relatively large share of proposals that did 
not see any need for reform on the one side and an also relatively large group favouring 
radical changes to the SGP on the other. The gap narrowed over time as an increasing share 
came round to the view that there was a need to adjust the existing rules of the SGP. At the 
same time that this consensus emerged, questions of political economy started to gain ground 
over welfare considerations. This probably reflected the experience of the stalemate between 
the Council and the Commission, which highlighted the institutional and credibility problems 
of the existing framework. 
3.2. Cluster analysis 
 
Cluster analysis is a useful exploratory statistical tool for organising data into groups of 
related observations such that those within a specific group are more similar to each other 
than they are to those in other groups. For many multivariate data sets, including our 101 
reform proposals, clustering is instrumental in providing a meaningful description of the data. 
Since no objective criteria for choosing the ‘optimal’ number of clusters exist, we proceeded 
on a tentative basis by successively increasing the number of clusters, starting with two. This   -15-
approach reveals four relatively stable groups across different types of clustering methods.
15 
All clusters beyond four contained only a limited number of proposals and hence did not 
contain enough information to qualify as a meaningful and distinct group. By contrast, less 
than four clusters were not enough to disclose differences across some of the variables 
characterising the 101 proposals. The distribution of the characterising variables of the 101 
proposals across the four clusters as well as across the characterising variables is presented in 
Table 3. It must be stressed that the four clusters do not form perfectly homogenous groups of 
economists in terms of the characterising variables.  The lines of demarcation are not that 
sharp. For some variables the differences across the groups are not statistically significant. 
However, the four clusters reveal patterns that give rise to sufficiently distinct and informative 
profiles. They mainly serve illustrative purposes. 
The four groups identified in our cluster analysis and presented ‘in order of appearance’ can 
be characterised as follows.  
Disenchanted reformers: The first group, which could be referred to as disenchanted 
reformers, includes 31 contributions from professional economists who hold very critical 
views about either the general utility or the effectiveness of the SGP or both. As a 
consequence, they mostly propose relatively incisive reforms, including major changes to the 
existing institutional set-up and/or its replacement by a totally different arrangement. 
Part of their reservations about the SGP may be explained by the fact that the group includes a 
relatively large share of economists from the US or from non-euro-area countries, hence not 
necessarily sharing a passion for the idea of a common currency or the related common fiscal 
framework. However, the euro-area economists in the group also hold fairly critical and 
sometimes disillusioned views. A further distinguishing feature of the disenchanted reformers 
is that they seem to have relatively clear ideas. Specifically, whereas multiple reform 
proposals are much more common in the other three groups, more than 90 percent of the 
papers presented by the disenchanted reformers advance only one  suggestion about how to 
'cure' the Pact.  
The average date of publication suggests a relatively early entry into the reform debate, 
around 13-14 months prior to November 2003. However, the proposals are widely distributed 
across time, including a number of very early papers, published well before any signs of SGP 
weakness had appeared on the horizon, as well as a number of very late works released after 
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November 2003. The common cement in this group is the view that fiscal discipline should 
not and cannot be the only scope of the SGP. Consequently, other policy aims, in particular 
short-term stabilisation, are advocated as well. Prominent representatives of the first group are 
Alesina (2001), Uhlig (2002), Calmfors (2003) and Tanzi (2004). 
Tanzi (2004) is among those who show sympathy for the idea that fiscal policy coordination 
in a monetary union could be left to market forces, i.e. to the decisions of rating agencies. 
Such an approach does not necessarily follow from a religious belief in market forces but 
from the conclusion that all fiscal rules are of little help unless they are totally and 
constitutionally binding, which in Tanzi's view is rarely the case. 
Uhlig (2002) also questions the credibility of the EU fiscal framework, in particular the 
credibility of the sanctions to be imposed on countries which violate the obligations of the 
SGP. However, unlike Tanzi (2004), he proposes to strengthen the framework by replacing 
the discretionary rule of the ECOFIN Council by (i) automatic rules and (ii) the possibility for 
any European citizen to take the EU to court and demand the imposition of penalty payments. 
Calmfors (2003) is a prominent representative of those who fully acknowledge the importance 
of fiscal rules as means to enhance fiscal discipline but who also point out that the SGP may 
increase output volatility because it hampers stabilisation efforts in downswings and does not 
provide sufficiently strong incentives to consolidate public finances in economic good times. 
Against this backdrop, he advocates modifications which allow the automatic stabilisers to 
operate fully and provide sufficient leeway for discretionary fiscal policy actions especially in 
the wake of large idiosyncratic shocks or large common shocks where monetary policy needs 
to be complemented by fiscal policy. 
Alesina (2001) argues that EU budgetary surveillance should worry less about the first or 
second decimal of the Member States' deficit figure. In his view, the focus should shift 
towards government expenditure, which in recent years had reached levels that rather hamper 
economic growth than improve the distribution of income. 
Defenders of fiscal discipline: The second group encompasses 19 economists who could be 
called defenders of fiscal discipline. Most of them entered the scene at the beginning of 2003 
when the strain on the SGP became more tangible. The group includes a relatively large share 
of academic economists (more than two thirds as compared to an overall share of 60 %). They 
are unified by the insight that the set of rules of the old SGP was not sufficiently effective in 
achieving what they predominantly perceive as the main aim of the SGP, notably fiscal   -17-
discipline and/or fiscal sustainability. Compared to the first group, there is a broader 
consensus that a common fiscal framework as such is necessary and useful. In particular, none 
of the proposals favours a 'market solution', which highlights their conviction that without any 
institutional mechanism things would be worse. The main critique advanced by the defenders 
of fiscal discipline relates to the design of the old SGP, which they think was not instrumental 
in achieving their favoured goal, also because of policy failures. 
The proposals advanced by the second group are largely based on explicit theoretical models. 
Very often they involve political economy considerations and provide empirical evidence 
pointing to the lack of credibility and enforceability of the old SGP. The proposals 
predominantly include suggestions for procedural and institutional changes aimed at 
strengthening the SGP and taking into account the incentive structures of fiscal rules. In 
particular, the second group includes most proposals suggesting that fiscal surveillance should 
be entrusted to new and more independent fiscal institutions. Casella (1999), Wyplosz (2002), 
and Eichengreen (2003) are particularly illustrative representatives of this group. 
Wyplosz (2002) was among the first to launch and elaborate on the idea of independent fiscal 
councils (IFPCs) as a solution to the fiscal co-ordination problem in EMU. In analogy to 
monetary policy, he essentially proposes to free fiscal policy-making from political 
interference, thereby addressing the basic credibility problem of the old SGP, i.e. the fact that 
Member States judge their own policies through the Council of the European Union. Taking 
into account the complexity of fiscal policy vis-à-vis monetary policy the IFPC would not 
decide upon the size or the structure of the budget but ensure fiscal discipline by delivering 
debt sustainability. While endorsing their desirability, Wyplosz (2002) admits that the 
political feasibility of IFPCs may currently be limited. Variants on the independent council 
proposal are also made by von Hagen (2002) and Fatás et al. (2003), who are also part of the 
second group. 
Eichengreen (2003) proposes to strengthen fiscal discipline by extending the focus of the SGP 
to include the quality of national fiscal institutions. His suggestion draws on the results of the 
empirical literature showing that national institutional arrangements are strongly correlated 
with fiscal outcomes. Hence, the idea is to complement numerical deficit and debt rules with a 
surveillance framework that encourages Member States to adopt procedures conducive to 
sound public finances.   -18-
A much more radical and 'novel' reform proposal was put forward by Casella (1999) well 
before the SGP crisis actually emerged. The idea was to replace the rules and procedures of 
the SGP with a market for tradable deficit permits as an efficient mechanism for the 
implementation of fiscal constraints in EMU.  Such an arrangement is intended to allow 
flexibility at the country level while imposing ceilings for the euro area as a whole. However, 
Casella admitted that the enforcement of such a system would be weakened if governments 
maintained final control over the system, due to the probability that they would negotiate 
exceptions or ad hoc changes in the overall deficit ceiling. This proposal has since 
disappeared from the agenda. 
Advocates of economic growth: The third group comprises the advocates of economic growth, 
32 economists, who, on average, entered the reform debate around half a year before 
November 2003. By that time, it was already clear that neither France nor Germany, which 
had been deemed to be in excessive deficit in January 2003, was able, willing or ready to take 
sufficient consolidation measures to bring their deficits below the 3 % of GDP reference value 
within the specified deadlines. In addition, most large euro-area economies had been 
experiencing persistent low economic growth. Against this background, a considerable 
number of economists, mainly from large euro-area countries, argued that by focusing 
exclusively on short-term fiscal discipline, the old SGP did not ensure a sufficiently balanced 
policy mix and provided insufficient scope for fiscal policy to support economic growth. This 
gave rise to the perception that the SGP represented a set of rules with little economic 
rationale. The possibility that the protracted slowdown of economic growth could reflect a 
slowdown in the underlying growth potential, hence affecting the level of sustainable 
expenditure, was either not considered or rejected. 
The representatives of this group, which included a relatively large number of non-academics, 
predominantly based their analysis on welfare considerations, arguing implicitly or explicitly 
that putting more weight on economic growth rather than on fiscal discipline would be 
welfare-enhancing. Political economy considerations concerning the incentives or 
disincentives of the old SGP were given only minor importance or left out of the discussion. 
This is also why their reform proposals do not aim for a major modification of the 
institutional setup of the SGP. The preferred option is a change in existing rules and 
procedures. Particularly illustrative examples of the third group are Bofinger (2003), Fitoussi 
(2002) and Mathieu and Sterdyniak (2003).   -19-
Bofinger (2003) presents one of the most uncompromising proposals prioritising economic 
growth. He advocates a benchmark system for best practices of fiscal policy that contributes 
to economic growth and employment.  
The proposals put forward by Fitoussi (2002) are distinctly less radical but still motivated by 
the idea that fiscal rules should be state-dependent, i.e. should adjust to prevailing economic 
conditions or allow more leeway to react to changing economic conditions.  In concrete terms, 
Fitoussi (2002) argues that the deficit rule should be replaced by a debt rule which, in contrast 
to a medium-term target of close-to-balance or in surplus in the old SGP, would allow 
Member States to run a deficit in the medium term. Fitoussi's (2002) second suggestion is to 
allow for the 'golden rule' of public finances, highlighting the importance of public investment 
for economic growth. 
Mathieu and Sterdyniak (2003) argue against the desirability of supranational economic 
policy co-ordination as a whole. In their view, surveillance of economic policy should be 
'subordinated to the national policy prerogative of managing the production-inflation trade-
off'. The Commission and the Council should only act if spillover effects effectively endanger 
the inflation target for the euro area as a whole.  
Supporters of long-term sustainability: The 19 economists in the fourth group could properly 
be characterised as supporters of long-term sustainability. On average, they mobilised shortly 
before or after November 2003 and host the largest share of academics as well as a relatively 
large share of economists from small European countries. The common denominator 
emerging from their proposals is the view that fiscal rules should focus on the long-term 
sustainability of public finances, rather than imposing annual deficit targets. Their proposals 
are mostly based on the argument that putting more emphasis on long-run sustainability 
within the set-up of the SGP provides additional leeway for short-term stabilisation policy and 
growth-oriented economic policies, without jeopardising fiscal discipline.  
Two elements distinguish the fourth group from the third; one of degree, the other more of 
substance. In a virtual hierarchy of aims, the economists from the fourth group would put 
more weight on the fiscal stability aspect of the SGP than on economic growth. Moreover, the 
supporters of long-term sustainability show a more pragmatic or differentiated approach than 
the third group. This is evidenced by the fact that on average they put forward almost two 
proposals per paper or publication. Prominent representatives of the fourth group are Beetsma 
and Debrun (2003), Calmfors and Corsetti (2004) and Pisani-Ferry (2002).   -20-
Pisani-Ferry (2002) identifies a broad consensus on the need for fiscal discipline in EMU but 
raises the issue about how it should be defined and/or made operational. In his view, the focus 
on the deficit in the SGP is too narrow; the debt should be given more prominence. He also 
touches upon the more general limitations of traditional indicators such as the deficit and the 
debt in capturing all operations affecting sustainability of public finances. His proposal is to 
shift away from an annual assessment of deficit figures to a medium-term-oriented approach 
monitoring comprehensive public finance accounts that allow the potential impact of off-
balance-sheet liabilities to be assessed. 
Beetsma and Dedrun (2003) argue that a strict implementation of fiscal rules like the SGP 
may hamper structural reforms, as they may involve substantial up-front costs and thus 
sacrifice future growth.  Hence, a more flexible interpretation of the 3 % of GDP deficit 
threshold of the Treaty is proposed, though subject to the condition that the quality of 
structural reform is assessed by a politically independent institution, and that structural 
reforms do not affect the long-term sustainability of public finances. This last part, 
highlighting the priority of sustainability, distinguishes Beetsma and Debrun (2003) from the 
advocates of economic growth. 
With a view to giving the SGP more legitimacy, Calmfors and Corsetti (2004) suggest 
increasing its short-term flexibility on the deficit threshold by giving more weight to elements 
of long-term sustainability. In practical terms, they propose to make the deficit ceiling 
explicitly conditional on the debt level, allowing low-debt countries to run larger deficits in 
downswings than high-debt countries.  In addition, like a large number of other proposals 
across all four groups, they see the need to depoliticize the enforcement of the fiscal rules, i.e. 
to limit the role of the ECOFIN Council. 
In conclusion, the cluster analysis reveals a number of important differences in the way the 
economics profession assessed the old SGP. These differences reflect a divergence in opinion 
about fiscal policy in general. To begin with, there is no consensus about the welfare 
implications of the SGP. One camp would seem to take it for granted that the SGP is an 
economically desirable set of rules which needs a more or less comprehensive political-
economy type of ‘re-engineering’ in order to make it function properly. Conversely, others 
hold the view that the main problem of the old SGP is its primary policy objective rather than 
the political constraints ensuing from the institutional and procedural set-up. Yet another 
group believes that the old SGP failed or should be improved on both accounts.   -21-
There also seem to be some notable differences between views held inside and outside the 
euro area, with the ‘outsiders’ being somewhat more critical of the various aspects of the old 
SGP. Among the ‘insiders’, economists from academia exhibit a somewhat stronger 
conviction about the importance of fiscal discipline, whereas non-academics seem to be more 
inclined to prioritize other policy goals such as short-term stabilization or economic growth.  
 
4. The reformed Stability and Growth Pact: eclectic or sectarian? 
 
While there are clear and frequent interactions between economics and politics, it is the 
privilege of policy-makers to draw their own conclusions on pending economic policy issues. 
Thus, the intensive reform debate on the SGP among professional economists preceding the 
actual reform measures may not necessarily be a faithful mirror of the policy discussion, let 
alone of the actual steps taken by policy-makers.  
 
In his section we try to briefly outline how many and which of the views aired in the 
economics profession eventually made their way into the reformed 2005 SGP. The 
foundations of the new Pact are laid out in the report ‘Improving the implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact’ adopted by the ECOFIN Council on 20 March 2005. The two key 
parameters that epitomised the old Pact, the 3 % of GDP reference value for the deficit and 
the 60 % of GDP reference value for the debt, remained untouched, not least because they are 
part of the EU Treaty, a modification of which would have been more difficult to achieve. 
However, the safeguarding of the two reference values went along with a series of significant 
modifications of the secondary legislation shaping the implementation of the Pact. A detailed 
overview of the 2005 modifications is presented in European Commission (2005). 
 
The main modifications aim to improving the economic rationale underlying the fiscal rules 
and their implementation. The lack of economic rationale was a criticism advanced by policy-
markers and professional economists alike. A great many of the 101 reform proposals 
examined here hold the view that some elements of the SGP did not actually make much 
sense from an economic point of view, including the fact that a one-size-fits-all rule would 
not sufficiently account for differences across countries. The reformed SGP takes account of 
this criticism by providing more room for country-specific considerations, in both its 
preventive and its corrective arms. 
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As regards the preventive arm, the medium-term budgetary objective of Member States 
should not necessarily be to achieve a balanced budget or surplus for all countries. Rather, the 
economic and fiscal situation of each Member State, notably the current debt to GDP ratio, 
potential GDP growth and sustainability of public finances, will be judged on a country-by-
country basis. Thus, countries with a combination of low debt and high potential GDP growth 
will be allowed to aim for a small structural deficit whereas countries with a combination of 
high debt and low potential growth will still be required to move towards a balanced budget 
or a surplus. 
 
The revised SGP also allows greater differentiation across countries concerning the 
adjustment process towards the medium-term objective. The annual adjustment expressed in 
structural terms, i.e. net of cyclical factors and one-off and other temporary measures can be 
modulated vis-à-vis the reference value of 0.5 % of GDP per year, depending on prevailing or 
expected economic conditions. In addition, a Member State that adopts major structural 
reforms with verifiable positive effects on the long-term sustainability of its public finances 
may temporarily deviate from its medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it. 
 
As regards the corrective arm of the reformed SGP, country-specific conditions are now given 
more importance throughout the excessive deficit procedure. In particular, the procedure is no 
longer linear. It allows for the repetition of certain steps in the light of adverse economic 
events specific to the Member State. The new SGP also modifies the definition of ‘excessive 
deficit’. In particular, the conditions under which an excess over 3 % of GDP can be 
considered exceptional have become less stringent. Instead of being defined as an annual fall 
of real GDP by at least 2 %, which has never been observed in any euro area country since the 
SGP entered into force, the new SGP refers to a negative growth rate or the output loss 
accumulated during a protracted period of very low growth relative to potential. This too will 
require a country-specific assessment. 
 
It is clear that the reform of the SGP pays less attention to the role of procedures and 
institutions, an aspect which featured prominently in the reform debate among professional 
economists. In particular, a significant part of the economic profession linked the lack of 
enforcement to weaknesses in the governance structure of the EU fiscal surveillance, notably 
the fact that large countries in breach of the SGP had a high degree of leverage in the Council. 
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Similarly, the Commission’s position was assessed to be too weak vis-à-vis the Council to 
effectively live up to its role of Guardian of the Treaty. 
 
Against this backdrop, a number of reform proposals concluded that enforcement should be 
improved by strengthening the institutions and procedures at both the European and the 
national level. This view is only marginally reflected in the reformed SGP, however. It is true 
that, unlike the old Pact, it gives the Commission the possibility to directly issue policy advice 
to Member States via its preventive arm without the approval of the Council. However, no 
changes were made to the governance of its corrective arm. Moreover, fiscal governance at 
national level is addressed only very cursorily, by stating that national institutions could play 
a more prominent role in budgetary surveillance. 
 
Taken as a whole, the reform of the SGP builds upon the presumption that enforceability can 
be mainly achieved by enhancing the economic rationale of the common fiscal rules and 
hence their ownership by national policy-makers. In particular, more prominence is now 
given to the economic situation of the Member States as well as to other country-specific 
elements when assessing fiscal performance at all levels of the EU’s budgetary surveillance. 
Moreover, some of the parameters of the fiscal rules are modified to bring them closer to 
‘economic reality’. The second route towards improved enforceability, namely by 
strengthening the procedures and institutions of the EU fiscal surveillance system, is given 
less importance. 
 
In terms of the four broad groups of economists identified in the previous section, the changes 
incorporated in the new SGP in March 2005 appear to be most in line with the views of the 
advocates of economic growth and to some extent with the views of the disenchanted 
reformers. Nevertheless, some of the innovations of the reformed SGP, specifically the 
country-specific medium-term budgetary objectives that may differ from close to balance or 
in surplus depending on debt and growth performance, reflect ideas put forward by the 
supporters of long-term sustainability. Only the defenders of fiscal discipline seem to have 
had little impact on the outcome of the actual reform process. 
 
5. Why so many proposals? 
 
About one hundred proposals to reform the SGP, as summarized in Annex 1, have been 
presented in recent years by professional economists. This is just the tip of the iceberg as we   -24-
have excluded proposals written in languages other than English as well as reform 
recommendations made by economists in government positions and in banking and finance. If 
a full count of all such proposals were made, we suspect the number would be closer to a 
thousand than to a hundred. In addition, there are all the policy suggestions made in 
newspaper editorials and op-ed contributions across Europe. The SGP has truly contributed to 
a lively debate on European economic issues. 
 
Why do we see this multiplicity of recommendations? In our view, several – at least seven – 
factors contribute to this striking outcome. They are highly interrelated – in particular the first 
three factors discussed below. 
 
1. The crisis of the SGP: One of the main reasons is, of course, the crisis of the SGP in 2003-
2005. The Pact came under heavy criticism due to the difficulties of several Member States in 
living up to the rules. As the Pact did not deliver the fiscal performance it was supposed to, 
this perceived failure created incentives to produce recommendations for reforms. 
 
Actually, it is the task of economists to accept such challenges in the public arena. They do so 
whenever they see a prospect of improving current policies. This pattern is evident throughout 
the history of economics as an academic field. Current economic problems create a demand 
for policy advice, and the economics profession stands ready to supply it. This makes research 
in economics topical and event-driven, in particular in the field of fiscal and monetary 
policy.
16 The 101 proposals for reform are a clear illustration of this pattern. We conjecture 
that even if the Pact had worked efficiently and smoothly, such a success would in itself invite 
policy proposals, although there would most likely have been fewer of them than was the 
actual case with the Pact failing. 
 
Our cluster analysis brings out the topicality of the policy proposals. It demonstrates that the 
timing of the publication of proposals is closely tied to the degree of political tension 
surrounding the Pact – the greater the tension, the more proposals. Although not all of the 
authors refer explicitly to the problems of the SGP as the main factor behind their proposals, 
the majority of them are inspired by the problems of implementing the Pact. 
                                                 
16 See for example Hicks (1967, p. 156): ‘but with monetary theory it is more often a particular understanding – 
an understanding directed towards a particular problem, normally a problem of the time at which the work in 
question was written. So monetary theories arise out of monetary disturbances.’   -25-
2. Changing circumstances – from debt to growth: Another factor behind the multiplicity is 
changes in the macroeconomic conditions of the euro area after the Maastricht Treaty came 
into force and the Pact was signed. As described in section 2, the SGP was designed in the 
1990s, when the sharp rise in government debt and high inflation during the 1980s was 
regarded as the principal common challenge for European policy-makers. A major priority on 
the policy agenda in those days was to prevent and reduce the debt build-up. This 
macroeconomic situation as well as the prevailing macroeconomic policy view was codified 
in the SGP in 1997. 
 
Since 1997, new macroeconomic issues and thus new goals have emerged on the top of policy 
priorities. Stagnation and lack of dynamism in the euro area has triggered an interest in 
policies promoting growth, expansion and employment. This has given rise to proposals to 
changes in the Pact to meet these new policy challenges. In addition, the fact that these issues 
are not identical across the EU contributes to the plethora of proposals. 
 
3. Lack of consensus about the role of fiscal policy: The most important explanation behind 
the multiplicity of proposals is the lack of consensus about the role of fiscal policy in general. 
Economists are not in agreement about the proper goals, instruments and institutional 
framework for fiscal policy-making. This state of affairs reflects a lack of a commonly 
accepted theory for fiscal policy. After the demise of the Keynesian majority view on fiscal 
policy of the 1950s and 1960s, several rival theories for stabilization policies have competed 
in the market for ideas. In short, there is no ruling paradigm for fiscal policy-making and there 
are no signs of a new consensus view emerging.
17 
 
This point can be brought out by contrasting the state of affairs of fiscal policy with the case 
of monetary policy. Today, there is a majority view in the economics profession on the role of 
monetary policy, roughly consisting of the following building blocks. The goal of the modern 
central banks is a low and stable rate of inflation, the instrument is changes in short-term 
interest rates under the control of the central bank. The policy strategy is forward-looking and 
rule-bound. The preferred institutional framework is a central bank with substantial 
independence from the government and the ministry of finance but held accountable for its 
actions to a democratic assembly. This philosophy has underlain the acceptance of inflation 
                                                 
17 In addition, as discussed below, there is considerable disagreement about the empirical evidence concerning 
the effects of fiscal policy.    -26-
targeting by central banks in many countries since the early 1990s. It is also the intellectual 
foundation of monetary policy-making in the euro area. 
 
The theoretical roots of today’s ruling monetary policy paradigm should be traced back to 
Milton Friedman’s seminal address to the American Economic Association in 1968, ‘The role 
of monetary policy’ – one of the most influential, if not the most influential, article on 
macroeconomics in the post-World-War-II period. Friedman (1968) discussed what monetary 
policy can and cannot do. It should not try to peg the interest rate or the rate of 
unemployment. Instead, it should focus on a nominal variable such as the exchange rate, the 
price level or the money stock.
18 He also provides a theoretical basis for his policy 
recommendations founded on the natural rate approach. 
 
Turning back to fiscal policy, no commonly accepted article or treatise on ‘The role of fiscal 
policy’ similar to Friedman’s locus classicus on monetary policy has survived the test of time. 
One of the last unified accounts of the Keynesian consensus concerning fiscal policy is 
Blinder and Solow (1974). Today there is no common theory of fiscal policy, although there 
has been a gradual movement away from the belief in short-term fine-tuning and discretionary 
actions of the 1950s and 1960s to a more rule-bound approach, stressing fiscal discipline, the 
role of automatic stabilizers and the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
 
The divergence of views on fiscal policy is best illustrated on the basis of three key 
dimensions of fiscal policy-making: goals, instruments and institutions. All possible 
combinations of agreement and disagreement along these dimensions are represented in our 
sample of 101 proposals to reform the SGP. The following examples illustrate the point. 
 
Most obviously, there is a wide dispersion of views concerning the main goal of the SGP. In 
our analysis of the 101 proposals, we identified at least seven different categories of fiscal 
policy objectives – see Tables 1 and 2. However, even if there is an agreement on goals, 
views may still diverge strongly concerning the proper instruments and institutions. For 
instance, across all four groups found in our cluster analysis, many proposals agree on the 
main goal of the SGP but draw different conclusions about either the effectiveness of fiscal 
                                                 
18 Among these three potential goals, the price level has emerged as the prime goal as witnessed by the 
emergence of inflation targeting. Financial liberalization and the move from fixed to flexible exchange rates 
have facilitated the adoption of inflation targeting. As is well known, Friedman (1968) proposed monetary 
targeting, a strategy not followed today by central banks. 
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policy instruments or the appropriateness of fiscal institutions or both. Specifically, among the 
group of disenchanted reformers, a relatively large number of economists believe that fiscal 
discipline should be the main aim of the SGP and they clearly share this view with the 
economists in the second group, the defenders of fiscal discipline. However, there are distinct 
differences concerning the way the agreed goal can or should be implemented. Some think 
that – within an appropriate institutional design – fiscal policy-making would be conducive to 
fiscal discipline, while others are more sceptical about the possibility of effectively pursuing 
fiscal discipline because, depending on the state of the economy, it should be traded off with 
other goals. 
 
A further element of dissent for a given goal is the time frame. A large number of proposals, 
especially those put forward by the defenders of fiscal discipline, argue that fiscal discipline 
should be enforced on a yearly basis. Conversely, there are many economists among both the 
disillusioned reformers and the supporters of long-term sustainability maintaining that fiscal 
discipline must be assessed over a longer period within the framework of the intertemporal 
budget constraint. 
 
In many cases, when there is disagreement about goals, the proposals still stand on the 
common ground that some improvements or changes in existing fiscal institutions would be 
instrumental in improving fiscal performance, and in any case better than going for a pure 
'market solution'. However, in this context, the dissent often refers to the question of whether 
policy-makers should be given more or less discretion in implementing the rules. Some 
proposals suggest reliance on more independent fiscal authorities (many are to be found 
among the defenders of fiscal discipline and some among the supporters of long-term 
sustainability), possibly run by experts rather than by politicians, while others call for more 
flexibility and leeway for national policy-makers, not least with a view to increasing 
ownership of the fiscal rules. 
 
The existence of these two fundamentally different views, the traditional view assuming 
welfare-maximizing policy-makers and the political economy view, is evident in very many 
proposals. These two approaches give radically different policy recommendations. The 
traditionalists tend to support a loosening of the Pact, giving more discretionary power to  
policy-makers. Economists in the political economy camp tend to suggest stronger constraints 
on policy-makers. The debate is basically about constraining or liberating the fiscal policy-  -28-
makers.
19 Alternatively, we may talk about an optimistic and pessimistic approach to fiscal 
policy-making where the optimists (the welfare view) tend to believe in the capacity of well-
intentioned policy-makers while the pessimists (the political economy view) doubt their 
intentions as well as their capacity to carry out the proper policies. 
 
The picture becomes still more complex when we consider that fiscal policy is not solely 
focused on stabilization or fiscal discipline, but also on issues of allocation and distribution. 
This implies that issues of trade-offs between ‘fairness’ (distribution) usually emerge when 
fiscal stabilization measures are considered. This is hardly the case with the ruling monetary 
policy paradigm of today. 
 
Although no common fiscal policy paradigm exists today, this fact is not explicitly considered 
by any contributor as far as we can see. The standard approach is the following: each author 
adopts his/her model following his/her paradigm, without mentioning any of the many 
alternatives, and then proceeds to produce a reform proposal. Very few of the policy 
proposals even bother to define explicitly what is meant by fiscal policy. From this we are 
tempted to conclude that most of the economists that have contributed to the SGP debate tend 
to be truly one-armed and one-eyed. 
 
4. Lack of empirical evidence: Another reason for the multiplicity of proposals is the fact that 
few authors use empirical evidence, including econometric results, concerning the efficacy of 
fiscal policy in support of their proposals. Of course, if the economist focuses solely on the 
sign of the effects of fiscal policy measures, in practice he or she becomes unconstrained by 
numbers. Such an attitude will allow for a larger supply of recommendations. 
 
The secondary role of econometric evidence among the proposals most likely reflects genuine 
disagreement among economists regarding the actual effects of fiscal policy measures. In 
short, the optimism about the impact of fiscal policy has been in decline since at least the 
1970s and has now been replaced by pessimism.
20 Estimates of fiscal multipliers range from 
close to zero to about one. The debate about non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy suggests 
negative multipliers, implying that contractionary fiscal measures may be expansionary under 
certain circumstances. Solid estimates of the effects of expenditure changes, tax changes, and 
                                                 
19 For an exposition of the theoretical and empirical arguments for constraining fiscal policy-makers, see among 
others Fatás and Mihov (2002) and Wyplosz (2005).   -29-
other fiscal measures simply do not exist today. This has contributed to the demise in the 
belief of discretionary fiscal policy as an effective stabilization tool, while the workings of 
automatic stabilizers have simultaneously been assigned a more prominent role.
21 
 
Hardly any of the 101 proposals discusses this fact – except those that suggest that fiscal 
policy should be reined in. Most likely, the same mechanism is at work here as in our 
discussion of the lack of a common theory for fiscal policy. As there is no common view on 
the empirical effects of fiscal policy, this issue is overlooked, allowing for a multitude of 
proposals. 
 
5.  A new economic landscape: Another factor behind the many proposals is that the 
institutional framework for the SGP is completely new for macroeconomists and policy-
makers alike. The euro area is the first case in history of a monetary union where monetary 
policy-making is centralized to one multinational central bank, the ECB, while fiscal policy-
making is decentralized to national governments.
22 Economists are thus venturing into virgin 
territory, which allows them to hold widely divergent views about the proper map to use for 
navigation. 
 
Concerning this emerging institutional setting, there is no consensus about the proper theory 
and thus the proper models to use to analyze the spillovers or externalities of domestic fiscal 
policy. Different models emphasize different channels for international policy dependence, 
thus giving rise to different reform proposals concerning policy coordination under EMU.
23 
Where a policy proposal is based on a spillover channel working through debt build-up, the 
proposal will tend to focus on measures to restrict debt. Where a model for demand-side 
spillovers is adopted, the policy recommendations will likely focus on deficit rules. Likewise, 
for a model of supply-side dependency, the policy reform suggested would stress steps to 
influence the quality of public finance.
24 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
20 See for example Auerbach (1994), Briotti (2005), De Mello et al. (2004) and Hemming et al. (2002).  
21 See for example Brunila et al. (2003), Orphanides (2000), Orphanides and Williams (2005) and Silgoner et al. 
(2003) on the effects of stabilization policies. 
22 See the surveys of monetary unions in Bordo and Jonung (2003).  
23 See for example Ardy et al. (2006, chapter 4) for a survey of the issues of policy coordination in the EMU. 
24 This point is developed in detail in chapter 4 in Hodson (2006).   -30-
Nor is there consensus concerning the numerical size of these spillover effects. So far 
econometric work in this field has difficulty in identifying any major effects, suggesting small 
and varying effects over time and over countries.
25 
 
Although the EMU is a new construction, the evidence on fiscal federalism dealing with the 
experience of stabilization policies in federal states like Canada, Switzerland and the United 
States may give guidance concerning the design of the SGP. However, very few of our 101 
proposals explicitly refer to the record from federal states. There is a surprising lack of 
interest in the literature on fiscal federalism among the proposal-makers, probably reflecting 
the bias towards theory at the expense of econometric and historical evidence.
26 
 
6. Different country experiences: The multiplicity of proposals also reflects the fact that the 
authors originate from different countries with different records on stabilization policy, 
deficits and debt and at different stages of the business cycle and with different growth rates. 
The macroeconomic situation – its past, present and future – of the authors’ home country 
thus influences the design of their proposals. There is a clear small/large country division, 
where authors from the large countries in the centre of the euro area, France, Germany and 
Italy, are more apt to loosen up the Pact than authors from small countries. There is also a 
tendency for more proposals to emanate from countries that are not complying with the SGP, 
as seen from our empirical work. The cluster analysis brings out these points. 
 
7. Different views on the political constraint – what is politically feasible? The sub-optimality 
of proposals: Another factor behind the multiplicity is the likelihood that economists differ in 
their views on what is politically feasible when designing policy advice. Thus, they choose to 
‘optimize’ their recommendations under different constraints. In principle, two economists 
may share the same view on what is the first-best solution to a specific problem. However, 
they may diverge in opinion when asked to prepare a policy proposal, depending on what they 
regard as politically feasible. 
 
Of course, we are not able to derive the first-best solutions held by the authors of the 101 
reform proposals. Still, we should be aware that many proposals may be the outcome of ‘sub-
                                                 
25 See for example Gros and Hobza (2001). 
26 Nor are there many references to the literature on international spillovers of domestic policies.  
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optimal proposals’ or second-best thinking, reflecting the authors’ perception of what is 




Our account of 101 policy proposals to reform the SGP demonstrates that there is a consensus 
among the makers of the proposals in the sense that a large majority implicitly or explicitly 
view fiscal rules as desirable. Without such rules, a deficit bias, i.e. a tendency by 
governments to over-borrow and to build up unsustainable fiscal positions in the long run, 
would emerge. In addition and more specifically related to the EMU, there is a broad 
agreement that common supranational fiscal rules are necessary to address the risk of 
externalities (spillovers) from domestic fiscal policies. A stability and growth pact to 
coordinate fiscal policies is thus seen as instrumental. Only a small minority believe that the 
tendency to over-borrow and/or the risk of spillovers can be adequately handled by market 
forces, and even then, in some cases this position is not underpinned by genuine faith in the 
disciplining force of the financial markets but rather by the conviction that any policy solution 
would be subject to policy failure. 
The broad consensus about the desirability of fiscal rules is dissolved and turned into wide 
disagreement once the actual policy recommendations proposed to improve upon the 
workings of the SGP are examined more closely. Economists suggest a wide range of 
different solutions. We identify a number of factors explaining this multitude of proposals. In 
short, they are not based on a common explicit theoretical foundation or model, they are not 
based on a common empirical or econometric set of evidence, and they are not aimed at 
reaching the same policy objective. We identify at least six different goals for fiscal policy as 
well as a number of trade-offs between them. Often the same proposal aims at achieving more 
than one goal at the same time – breaching Jan Tinbergen’s dictum of ‘one goal, one 
instrument’. The methodologies adopted in the proposals range from narrative, through pure 
theoretical exercises, to econometric estimates. We conclude that the major reason for the 
multiplicity of reform proposals is the lack of common ground as to the role of fiscal policy, 
although other factors also contribute to the wide differences among the 101 proposals. 
Our results concerning fiscal policy-making in the euro area are in sharp contrast to the debate 
about the common monetary policy for the euro area. There is considerable agreement across 
the economics profession about the institutional structure of ECB, its independence, its 
objective and the instruments it should use. True, the ECB has been criticized, but the critique   -32-
is in the details. This debate has also tended to peter out. The ECB and its monetary strategy 
appear to have been basically accepted by the economic profession. 
 
The marked difference in professional opinion across economists is due, then, to the simple 
fact that there is a commonly accepted view on the role of monetary policy but not on the role 
of fiscal policy. As long as the profession is in disagreement about the role of fiscal policy, 
the SGP will be the subject of reform proposals. This will be the case for the new SGP as 
well.   -33-
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Table 3: 101 proposals to reform the SGP. Frequency distribution across clusters and characteristics 
F-test
12 3 4
No % No % No % No % No %
31 30.7 19 18.8 32 31.7 19 18.8 101 100
Variable Category
aim 1=Short-term stabilisation 3 9.7 6 31.6 5 15.6 5 26.3 19 18.8
2=Short-term budget discipline 5 16.1 4 21.1 1 3.1 1 5.3 11 10.9
3=Long-run sustainability 5 16.1 2 10.5 5 15.6 7 36.8 19 18.8
4=Optimal policy mix 4 12.9 2 10.5 7 21.9 0 0.0 13 12.9
5=Economic growth 4 12.9 1 5.3 5 15.6 2 10.5 12 11.9
6=Combination of aims 5 16.1 4 21.1 7 21.9 3 15.8 19 18.8
7=Market solution 5 16.1 0 0.0 2 6.3 1 5.3 8 7.9
Total 31 100 19 100 32 100 19 100 101 100 0.11
model No 25 80.6 9 47.4 29 90.6 11 57.9 74 73.3
Yes 6 19.4 10 52.6 3 9.4 8 42.1 27 26.7
Total 31 100 19 100 32 100 19 100 101 100.0 0.00
empir No 25 80.6 6 31.6 10 31.3 15 78.9 56 55.4
Yes 6 19.4 13 68.4 22 68.8 4 21.1 45 44.6
Total 31 100 19 100 32 100 19 100 101 100 0.00
modif
0=No modification or stregthening of 
SGP 1 3.2 1 5.3 2 6.3 1 5.3 5 5.0
1=Reinterpretation of old SGP 3 9.7 0 0.0 1 3.1 0 0.0 4 4.0
2=Changes in rules and procedures 15 48.4 9 47.4 19 59.4 10 52.6 53 52.5
3=Changes in institutions 3 9.7 4 21.1 3 9.4 1 5.3 11 10.9
4=Changes in both rules and procedures 
and institutions 3 9.7 3 15.8 2 6.3 3 15.8 11 10.9
5=Abolish the SGP, alternatives 6 19.4 2 10.5 5 15.6 4 21.1 17 16.8
Total 31 100.0 19 100.0 32 100.0 19 100.0 101 100.0 0.83
nprop 1 28 90.3 16 84.2 23 71.9 10 52.6 77 76.2
2 0 0.0 1 5.3 6 18.8 8 42.1 15 14.9
3 3 9.7 2 10.5 2 6.3 0 0.0 7 6.9
More than 3 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 3.1 1 5.3 2 2.0
Total 31 100 19 100 32 100 19 100 101 100 0.16
welf Political economy 10 32.3 8 42.1 9 28.1 5 26.3 32 31.7
Welfare 15 48.4 7 36.8 20 62.5 10 52.6 52 51.5
Both 6 19.4 4 21.1 3 9.4 4 21.1 17 16.8
Total 31 100.0 19 100.0 32 100.0 19 100.0 101 100.0 0.48
date More than 6 years 2 6.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 2.0
Less than 6 and more than 2 years 3 9.7 3 15.8 2 6.3 1 5.3 9 8.9
Less than 2 years and more than 1 year 2 6.5 4 21.1 3 9.4 1 5.3 10 9.9
One year before Nov. 2003 8 25.8 7 36.8 11 34.4 6 31.6 32 31.7
After Nov. 2003 16 51.6 5 26.3 16 50.0 11 57.9 48 47.5
Total 31 100.0 19 100.0 32 100.0 19 100.0 101 100.0 0.32
large Small 6 19.4 4 21.1 4 12.5 6 31.6 20 19.8
Large 22 71.0 15 78.9 28 87.5 11 57.9 76 75.2
Both 3 9.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 10.5 5 5.0
Total 31 100 19 100 32 100 19 100 101 100 0.22
euro Non-euro area 11 35.5 6 31.6 5 15.6 5 26.3 27 26.7
Euro-area  16 51.6 12 63.2 25 78.1 11 57.9 64 63.4
Both 4 12.9 1 5.3 2 6.3 3 15.8 10 9.9
Total 31 100 19 100 32 100 19 100 101 100 0.21
eur Non-EU 4 12.9 4 21.1 1 3.1 2 10.5 11 10.9
EU 23 74.2 14 73.7 29 90.6 17 89.5 83 82.2
Both 4 12.9 1 5.3 2 6.3 0 0.0 7 6.9
Total 31 100 19 100 32 100 19 100 101 100 0.21
acad No 10 32.3 5 26.3 11 34.4 1 5.3 27 26.7
Yes 18 58.1 13 68.4 15 46.9 15 78.9 61 60.4
Both 3 9.7 1 5.3 6 18.8 3 15.8 13 12.9
Total 31 100.0 19 100.0 32 100.0 19 100.0 101 100.0 0.10
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Annex 1: List of 101 reform proposals in alphabetic order 
Nr. Authors  Title  Publication 
      
1  Alesina, A.  (2001)  The Stability and Growth Path: Experiences and 
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A comment on Buti relation, in Temi di Finanza Pubblica by A 
Monorchio and A.Verde, Cacucci Editore, Bari 
2  Allsopp, C. and M.J. Artis (2003)  The Assessment: EMU, Four Years On  Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 19, No. 1 
3  Angelo, S., M. Marterbauer, I. Mozart, B. 
Rossmann, M. Schratzenstaller and N. Templ 
(2004) 
Alternatives to the Stability and Growth Pact  Proposals for 
a new EU fiscal policy regime 
Austrian federal chamber of labour, AK, mimeo 
4  Annet, A., J. Decressin  and M. Deppler (2005)  Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact 05/02  IMF Policy Discussion Paper 05/2 
5  Arestis, P., K. McCauley and M. Sawyer (1999)  The Future of the Euro: Is There an Alternative to the SGP?  The Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 296  
6  Balassone, F., D. Franco and R. Giordano (2004)  Market Induced Fiscal Discipline: Is there a Fall-back 
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Paper presented at XVI Villa Mondragone International 
Economic Seminar University of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’ 
7  Barysh, K. (2003)  A Pact for Stability and Growth  Centre for European Reform Policy Brief 
8  Beetsma, R. and X. Debrun (2003)  Reconciling Stability and Growth: Smart Pacts and 
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IMF Working Paper, No. 174 
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ECB Working Papers Series, No. 433  
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Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4 
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12  Begg, I., D. Hodson and I. Maher (2003)  Economic Policy Coordination in the European Union  National Institute Economic Review, No. 183 
13  Belke, A. and D. Gros (1998)  Asymmetric shocks and EMU: On a Stability Fund  Intereconomics 
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for Reforming Macroeconomic Policymaking in Euroland 
University of Hamburg,  Working Paper, No. 379  
15  Blanchard, O. and F. Giavazzi (2003)  Improving the SGP through a Proper Accounting of Public 
Investment 
MIT mimeo 
16  Bofinger, P. (2003a)  The Stability and Growth Pact Neglects the Policy Mix 
between Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
Intereconomics   -40-
17  Bofinger  P. (2003b)  Why the Stability and Growth Pact Provides neither 
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Universität Würzburg, mimeo 
18  Bofinger. P. and E. Mayer (2004)  The Stability and Growth Pact: Time to Rebuild!  Paper presented Annual Meeting of the German Economic 
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19  Brück, T. and R. Zwiener (2004)  Fiscal Policy Rules for Stabilisation and Growth: A 
Simulation Analysis of Deficit and Expenditure Targets in a 
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German Institute for Economic Research, mimeo 
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25  Buiter, W. (2003b)  How to Reform the Stability and Growth Pact  Central Banking,  Vol. 8, No. 3 
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Georgetown University, mimeo  
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OFCE Working Paper,  No. 2003-04 
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